all internees, including Japanese citizens, were asked to respond yes or no to a loyalty oath, was one object of particular study; another was the continuing WRA effort to institute a restricted form of self-government in the centers. The work of the camp analysts on these topics was supplemented by occasional reports from visiting anthropologists, among them Arensberg's (1942) "Report on a Developing Community, Poston, Arizona" and Provinse and Kimball's (1946) "Building New Communities During War Time."
Besides general evaluation of policy, anthropologists spent considerable time researching the specific question of how to reduce unrest in the camps. The catalyst for this research was the outbreak of serious strikes and riots in late 1942 and early 1943. At Poston, the arrest of two men accused of assaulting an internee many camp residents considered a WRA informer led to a one-day general work stoppage. At Manzanar, the detainment of a kitchen worker similarly charged triggered a full-scale riot. The WRA called in the military police; one fired into the crowd, killing two protesters. At Topaz, the shooting by a sentry of an elderly man who had strayed a few feet beyond the barbed-wire camp boundary led to a massive protest demonstration at the funeral. At Tule Lake, a revolt over poor work conditions ended with tear gas and occupation of the camp by the army.
Community analysts "were instructed to study the causes of resistance" (Spicer 1946:25) . The findings, summarized in a general report called "Evacuee Resistances to Relocation," blamed unrest on "deep-seated feelings of insecurity" caused by removal and "resistance(s) due to a newly developed social organization within the centers" (Embree 1943 :2). These feelings of insecurity and resistance, argued anthropologists, were exploited by a few malcontents. As Leighton (1945: 165) asserted of the Poston strike in a dubious generalization, "the movement, like almost all other social movements that have ever been carefully examined, was not truly spontaneous, but was whipped up by a small group playing on a responsive instrument." The general conclusion for administrators was that the disturbances would subside as the internees adjusted to camp life.
Along with this study of resistance and policy evaluation came the third element of anthropological advice to administrators-forecasting responses to alternative future programs. As Spicer (1946:18) put it, WRA ethnographers "attempted to predict the reactions of the various groups in the community to contemplated actions of the administration." These efforts ranged from detailing the expected results of reorganization of the WRA administrative hierarchy to assessing costs and benefits of proposed centralization of records on internees. The underlying assumption throughout was that anthropologists could formulate scientific laws about individual and social behavior in the camps, enabling them to anticipate the outcome of different administrative policies. Some ethnographers were even more ambitious, believing that observation of the relocation centers could provide general laws of human interaction. Leighton's (1945: 247) The Governing of Men, for example, describes 17 administrative principles thought to have "validity which is independent of any political theory or design for living." All 1 7 were based on Leighton's research at Poston. Evaluation, analysis of unrest, and prediction, then, were the three major aims composing the wider end of giving counsel to administrators. The main idea repeated again and again was that anthropologists have useful skills to put at the disposal of administrative authority. The ethnographers saw their role as making problems more intelligible, giving WRA authorities the information needed to maintain equilibrium and avoid resistance in the camps. In effect, anthropology was set up as a science of social control. When protest over poor wages broke out, anthropologists advised administrators how to control it (Wax 1953). When internees refused to get involved in camp self-government, anthropologists suggested ways to increase the level of participation (Spicer 1946) . When residents opposed the WRA plan for dispersed resettlement in the Midwest and on the East Coast, ethnographers came up with suggestions for defusing opposition (Embree 1943) .
In short, WRA anthropologists reformulated the classic Boasian axiom: instead of confronting power with truth, anthropology was to supply information to power. A fusion of administration and social science was the consequence. The people studied became objects of control and manipulation, and scientific methodology a means to the ends of government policy. The problem was not simply that anthropologists broke disciplinary taboos about mixing science and politics. In fact, WRA ethnographers were unequivocal in claiming neutrality and objectivity, as if their work had no political content. To understand the roots of anthropology's alignment with power in the WRA, one has to go back to the historical and disciplinary context.
A good starting point is the experience of the Depression and World War II. During the Indian New Deal, anthropologists had been hired for advice by the Soil Conservation Service in the wake of the disastrous Navajo stock reduction program.5 In wartime, they helped form the Committee for National Morale and were called to serve the Office of Strategic Studies, Army Specialized Training Program, and the Committee on Food Habits.6 These varied forms of involvement were part of a general push to prove the relevance of anthropology, first to economic recovery and then to the fight against fascism. Ralph Linton conveyed a sense of this project in The Science of Man in World Crisis (1945) , which brought together the writing of anthropologists from Clyde Kluckhohn to Julian Steward in a wartime collection aimed at showing the practical uses of social theory. The findings of social science, Linton wrote, "are of the utmost importance both for the intelligent planning of the new world order which now appears inevitable and for the implementation of any plans which may be made" (1945:vii) . Anthropologists, he continued (p. 11), "are attempting to arrive at certain generalizations, 'laws' in common parlance, which will make it possible to predict the course of events and ultimately to control it." Linton's faith in the progress of science-powerfully charged by a desire to create a structured and rational society out of the Depression and war-culminated in the vision of a "new social order... a conscious rebuilding of civilization in the face of new conditions" (1945:220-221 ).
Early applied anthropology, including WRA research, incorporated this same idea of science as the basis for a new order and shaped it into what retrospectively appears an unhappy union of power, knowledge, and social control. The regnant paradigm was summed up in a review article by Chapple entitled "Anthropological Engineering: Its Uses to Administrators" (1943).
Chapple's initial premise, which was probably derived from Radcliffe-Brown and shared by ethnographers at the camps, was that "anthropology is a natural science, which gives every promise of becoming an exact one" (1943:24) . The applied anthropologist puts this science at the disposal of authority, to allow administrators "to carry out ... routines and through them to control the relations of people" (1943:28); anthropology was thus not simply an objective science, but a tool for managers. Anthropologists, Chapple believed, should find ways for those in authority to avoid changes in the structure of the system: the ethnographer "must anticipate disturbances and eliminate them before they cause serious repercussions in his organization" (1943:28) . Resistance to the status quo is undesirable, and should be repressed with the help of the anthropologist qua technician:
If our society is to move more completely towards a democratic system, the engineers of human relations will have to devise methods by which all our institutions are made more efficient [1943: 32].
Chapple's ideas make it clear that the notion of anthropologists as technicians at the service of authority was not the independent invention of WRA ethnographers, but was borrowed and adapted from applied work begun in the 1930s. The parallels between the role of ethnographers in the WRA and the major early applied project, Lloyd Warner's 1931 study of the Hawthorne Plant of the Western Electric Company in Chicago, are very strong.7 In both, anthropologists were employed by management to study the managed; in both, anthropologists did predictions, evaluations, and research on causes of conflict with the ultimate goal of keeping the system running smoothly. Just as Warner "demonstrated that fatigue could be reduced through manipulation of interactional variables" (Eddy and Partridge 1978:17), WRA fieldworkers re-searched ways to "control stress" through "proper attention to the dissemination of the right facts to the right people at the right time" (Leighton 1945:281) .
The connections between the applied project for Western Electric and relocation research ten years later were by no means coincidental. Several WRA anthropologists-among them Arensberg and Kimball-were students of Warner at Harvard. Fieldwork for the WRA in fact closely followed the founding of the Society for Applied Anthropology in 1940. Almost all WRA anthropologists were early and active members of the SAA; John Provinse was its first president, Chapple the first editor. Many of these ethnographers published articles and reports on the camps in the society's journal, Applied Anthropology (which became Human Organization in 1948).
As the Chapple article suggests, these early applied anthropologists saw one of their basic goals as supplying administrators with technical services and information. In fact, a constant theme in ethnographic writings on relocation was the ultimate accountability of anthropologists to the WRA. Ethnographers saw no contradiction between this allegiance and their responsibility to their internee informants because they assumed that the interests of the WRA and of the Japanese Americans were the same. "The objectives of administrators and evacuees in center management were, in main outline, nearly parallel; both wanted harmony and were willing generally to make the basic adjustments once the sources of disharmony were understood" (Spicer 1946:28 1969:14) . WRA ethnographers viewed the blocks, headed by block leaders, as the integrated components of a complete functional system-the relocation center. Even before relocation was complete, anthropologists in all seriousness termed the camps "communities," or at least "devel-oping communities." Like Mexican villages or New Guinea tribes, the centers were thus thought to constitute the appropriate unit of ethnographic investigation. They were further assumed to have a cohesive social structure, based on the blocks, and corresponding cultural norms. In the camp communities, argued Provinse and Kimball (1946:402) , "sentiments of right and wrong, of the acceptable and the rejected appeared and were woven into a pattern of customs and beliefs that gave support to ... [the] structure." Anthropologists wrote extensively on culture in the camps, from tea ceremonies and sumo wrestling to architectural styles and garden arrangement. All these cultural developments were interpreted as "sure signs ... [of] evolution toward a community" (Arensberg 1942:8) .
Representation of the relocation centers as functionally integrated social systems explains the pervasive "scientific" view of resistance. The idea of disturbances as pathological threats to the common interest flowed naturally from the initial premise that the camps had developed into harmoniously cohesive communities. Leighton summarized the common view of resistance and nonconformism in Principle 6 from his Poston observations: Aggression arising from disturbed emotions and thoughts may: Stimulate the individual to take decisive actions that will free him from the forces causing the disturbed emotions and thoughts; Lead to confused and violent action wholly inappropriate to the circumstances of the individual [1945:265-266 ].
The suggestion here and in other WRA writings was that challenge to authority represented "confused" and "disturbed" behavior detrimental to the interests of an otherwise contented collective.
Through the testimony of the internees and the work of later scholars, we now know the grave problems with the picture of the camps anthropologists presented. Before the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians formed in 1980 (1982:169, 176), many witnesses powerfully and pointedly challenged the idea that the camps were integrated communities. While generally proud of their ability to keep families and lives in order through the hardships of internment, these Japanese Americans described the harsh conditions, fear, uncertainty, and conflict with the WRA that characterized life in the camps. As George Takei put it:
I was too young to understand, but I do remember the barbed wire fence from which my parents warned me to stay away. I remember the sight of high guard towers. I remember soldiers carrying rifles, and I remember being afraid [p. 169].
Kaya Noguchi continued:
Camp life was highly regimented and it was rushing to the wash basin to beat the other groups, rushing to the mess hall for breakfast, lunch, and dinner. When a human being is placed in captivity survival is the key. We developled] a very negative attitude toward authority. We spent countless hours to defy or beat the system [p. 176]. The notion that outbreaks of protest were dysfunctional deviations has also been rigorously questioned. In its place, an understanding of the unrest as a clear response to WRA policy has emerged. At Tule Lake, for instance, retrospective investigations have revealed that the strike in October 1942 grew out of WRA failure to meet demands for improved living conditions (barracks were overcrowded, running water was scarce, and open pit toilets were shared by the whole block), more self-government (the WRA had not fulfilled its promise of internee autonomy in much of camp administration), and clarification of the internees' legal status (most Tule Lake residents had not answered yes to the loyalty question).8 As James (1984) shows, overcrowding, unhygienic conditions, and poor food were major causes of strikes and riots at anthropologists and wartime internmentalmost all the camps; another was the WRA pay scale, under which internees could make a maximum monthly wage of $19 as compared with the $30 stipend of Army privates. In brief, the view that the centers were integrated communities with only "pathological" outbreaks of discontent says much more about the influence of structural functionalism on anthropologists of the 1940s than it does about the realities of relocation. But however poorly adapted to accurate analysis of the camps, functionalist theory was eminently well suited to presenting a picture of the centers as democratic and contented communities. Together with other contributions to the discourse about removal, the reports, articles, and books anthropologists produced describing the camps as communities helped justify relocation to the international community and to a domestic community eager to find that Executive Order 9066 was not inconsistent with the American way. In their published writings, WRA ethnographers told Americans what they wanted to hear-that far from being an ugly irrational racist enterprise, relocation was fair and democratic. The notions of structural balance, need fulfillment, and social harmony conveyed in anthropologists' reports were taken as confirmation that the democratic ideals for which the Allies were fighting had not been misplaced in relocation. Disturbances reported in the newspapers were not, according to anthropological analysis, signs of broader injustice but aberrational "trouble patterns" (Spicer et al. 1969:20) No trace is disclosed of the ironic distance from authority that Clifford (1983a) terms "ethnographic liberalism."
Recent research by
The only ethnographer clearly critical of the WRA was Rosalie Wax. As a graduate researcher for the University of California Japanese Evacuation and Resettlement Project directed by the sociologist Dorothy Swaine Thomas, Wax was uniquely and self-consciously situated outside the official administrative system that incorporated other camp anthropologists.9 Her almost two years at the Gila and Tule Lake centers became the basis for a series of writings-beginning with a University of Chicago dissertation (1950) and culminating in the personal reflections of Doing Fieldwork (1971)-in which she consistently characterized government relocation policy as at once incompetent and authoritarian.10 Ultimately removed from her position after WRA accusations of pro-Japanese agitation, subversion, and general troublemaking, Wax (1971:169) conveys a fine sense of her own ambiguous position, complicated by her German background, and of the intricately shifting patterns of schism and conflict at Tule Lake. She is insistently skeptical about the morality and management of internment.
Though none of the regular WRA ethnographers went as far as Wax, a few at least pointed out the diversity of attitudes within the relocation authority. Provinse and Kimball, for instance, described a range "from the few who were passionate believers in the development of democratic self-expression to the few who thought of themselves as autocratic guards of a prison camp" (1946:404). But the general perspective was that the WRA was doing a good job in difficult conditions, fostering enterprise and self-government among Japanese Americans. "The officers of the Authority," wrote Redfield, "try earnestly to put responsibility for making and carrying out decisions upon the evacuees ... the forms of government are emphatically democratic" (1943:153) . The specific imagery here, suggesting beneficent parental authority granting gradual independence to its dependents, ran through all the writings of WRA ethnographers. The broader reassurance was that under the generally democratic direction of the WRA the internees preserved their freedom, dignity, and self-determination.
The Roosevelt Administration was, in fact, eager to hear and to show that relocation bore no resemblance to the mass internments of the Nazis. The work of anthropologists on social integration in the relocation centers became ironic testimony to the value of American democracy and the moral superiority of the Allies.11 Anthropological writings were taken as evidence that America had progressed in suppressing xenophobic backlash against immigrants from enemy countries. Many Americans had been distressed by the sometimes violent antipathy directed against German Americans during World War I, and the cultural and culinary revisionism in which "sauerkraut" turned to "Liberty Cabbage," "Schmidt" to "Smith" and "frankfurters" to "hotdogs." Along with the nonconfinement of German and Italian Americans, the supposed successes of relocation were interpreted as signs that the irrational phobias of the earlier war had finally been dispelled.
It should again be emphasized that anthropological validation of internment was not the product of malice or sinister collusion with the government. I am not myself making the classic functionalist argument that effect explains cause, that the legitimizing dimension of ethnographic writing for the WRA is the reason it was produced. Nor am I contending that validation of relocation was the only result of ethnographic analyses. Among many other consequences, the work of WRA ethnographers helped institutionalize the applied subfield, diffuse structural functionalism, and set an early precedent for government-contract anthropology. The point, rather, is that anthropologists produced a body of literature that legitimized relocation while reflecting and promoting a conception of anthropology as a science of social control. Powerful pressures for this outcome were operating at a number of different levels. In applied anthropology, they included the nascent tradition of alignment with administrative authority and the vision of the ethnographer as social engineer. In anthropology at large, there was the dominance of the single society in a synchronic equilibrium model. In Washington, the WRA and administration wanted writing that supported its internment policy. And in general, strong popular anti-Japanese sentiments and the atmosphere of wartime patriotism were clearly conducive to an anthropology that supported relocation.
For all these forces favoring an ethnography sanctioning internment, it is important to remember that anthropological work for the WRA resulted from personal choices by ethnographers. After all, as a number of contemporary theorists aptly if somewhat tautologically remind us, all social production is mediated by individual thought and action (Giddens 1976 The most direct approach of WRA anthropologists to undercutting stereotypes was to criticize them as racist and un-American. In so doing, they were self-consciously working in the Boasian tradition of scientific attack on racialist thinking. WRA researchers, however, generally avoided the forceful tone of Boas' influential and emotional polemics. In a move that seems understandable if not praiseworthy, given the demands of wartime patriotism, anthropologists tended to represent internment as a process independent of federal control. The last line from Spicer's introduction to Impounded People is a good example. The book, he says, seeks "an understanding of what happens to people when democratic processes go wrong and a Government seeks to set them right" (Spicer et al. 1969:24) . Blame for removal is kept vague, unspecified, beyond human agency; the state enters only to correct the problem. The question of responsibility is effectively avoided.
Anthropologists at the same time largely evaded direct censure of the racism behind removal. Note, for instance, Spicer's awkward use of the euphemism "mental block": "Though westerners had known many Japanese for some thirty or forty years, they had a mental block which made them think of Japanese as mysterious, inscrutable, and latently dangerous" (1969:38). While sidestepping straightforward statements about the prejudicial nature of removal, anthro-pologists frequently quoted or paraphrased the views of others to make their point about discrimination. The use of the word "interpreted" in a sentence from a Bureau of Sociological Research article (1943:151) on "The Japanese Family in America" typifies this qualified approach: "The special adjustment problem of the Japanese ... is due to the fact that their relocation was a forced one which they interpreted as discrimination and rejection."
To supplement these often mediated critiques, anthropologists referred to the evidence of the camps themselves. The presumed model efficiency of the centers was presented as proof of the patriotism of the internees. The structural-functionalist representations of camp life that had such a strong legitimizing effect at the same time became signs to Americans that the internees were making a loyal contribution to the war effort. The evidence of camp harmony, anthropologists believed, helped combat "intensifying demand for repressive measures against the evacuees" (Spicer 1979:219). In this attempt to defuse prejudice, the writings of WRA ethnographers operated in much the same way as the thousands of photographs released by the WRA depicting internees happily at work practicing dentistry, making furniture, housecleaning, or working in the fields (see Figure 2) . The message in the pictures and in the work of ethnographers was that the internees were normal Americans, doing whatever was necessary to support the Allied cause. These efforts by anthropologists to undermine racist thinking were made with largely good intentions. While certainly coinciding with the WRA's interest in smooth postwar reassimilation, they were nevertheless genuine attempts both to show the irrationality of "Yellow Peril" Ansel Adams Figure 2 . "Our President has said that every loyal American citizen, regardless of his ancestry, should be given the opportunity to serve his country wherever his skills will make the greatest contribution, whether it be in industry or agriculture." thinking and to construct an image of national unity in the face of fascism. The problem, however, is that the specific form in which the analytical attacks were made had a series of unintended effects. First, they drew on culture and personality theory in a form that reflected and propagated public stereotypes about Japanese Americans while helping defuse controversy about internment; second, they used acculturationist analysis of the camps in a way that supported the government's presentation of removal as a positive step in the assimilation of Japanese Americans; third, they restricted description of time and space to delimit a discourse on removal rigidly circumscribed by refusal to criticize relocation. Along with structural functionalism, culture and personality theory became a guiding paradigm for WRA research. Reflecting its influence was the direct application of national character analysis to the camps. Most notable was an article by Weston LaBarre (1945) , the title of which-"Some Observations on Character Structure in the Orient: The Japanese"-belies the fact that it was based entirely on the author's 44-day stint as community analyst at Topaz.12 Drawing heavily on Freudian terminology and the accompanying emphasis on childrearing practice characteristic of culture and personality research, LaBarre (1945:326) described the Japanese as "probably the most compulsive people in the world ethnological museum." Rigid toilet training, he argued, was the root of the problem: the crucial trauma is at the anal level of development, with possible traumata at the oral level, so conspicuous in the schizophrenic picture, of distinctly minor importance. The compulsive character is thus largely the product of severity or cruelty in treatment during the period of cleanliness [1945:326] .
Growing directly out of
The compulsive personality of the Japanese, continued LaBarre, has 19 traits: secretiveness, hiding of emotions and attitudes; perseveration and persistency; conscientiousness, selfrighteousness; a tendency to project attitudes; fanaticism; arrogance; "touchiness;" precision and perfectionism; neatness and ritualistic cleanliness; ceremoniousness; conformity to rule; sadomasochistic behavior; hypochondriasis; suspiciousness; jealousy and enviousness; pedantry; sentimentality; love of scatological obscenity and anal sexuality [1945:326-327] .
No other WRA anthropologist so starkly confused character and caricature. But LaBarre's rhetoric exemplified the general tendency of ethnographers to do "cultural" analyses that reformulated popular perceptions about the intrinsic difference, inscrutability, and cruel conformism of Japanese Americans in scientific jargon. A good example is this passage from Arensberg:
For a 'Caucasian' group much of this [cooperation in the camps] might perhaps be extraordinary. But the Japanese both rural and urban have a long history of living in crowded communities and subjecting one another to conventional controls [1942:8] .
Another is the assertion of Provinse and Kimball that without WRA leadership, internees would have formed "a subversive underground in open conflict with authority which would have maintained its control through a system of terrorism" (1946:409). As in other WRA writing, the images here clearly drew from convoluted common notions about Japanese regimentation and conspiracy-notions that generally tended to confuse Japanese and Chinese in the category of "Oriental" so heavily diffused in popular culture and more concretely promoted by exclusionist anti-Asian immigration leagues. Applied to the camps, then, the culture and personality approach tended to lead to "scientific" restatement of conventional stereotypes. In conjunction with structural functionalism, it at the same time helped produce extraordinarily ahistorical analyses of camp society and culture. Typical was an article by Marvin Opler (1945) in the American Anthropologist, "A 'Sumo' Tournament at Tule Lake." After a passing reference to the fact that the tournament was held in a "segregation center," Opler went on to describe it as a timeless manifestation of Japanese character and culture. The analysis overflows with native terminology-gyujis, gunpai, and ozeki-and does not consider the possibility that sumo might have changed under the harsh conditions at Tule Lake, where all allegedly disloyal Japanese Americans were held. That the sumo tournament itself was viewed by many internees as a symbolically laden gesture of nationalist resistance to domination was an interpretation entirely missed or suppressed in this account. Spicer The second stage in anthropologists' application of acculturationism was the relocation center. WRA ethnographers made clear that the centers represented a new stage in the moderni-american ethnologist zation of Japanese Americans-communities which, while preserving many aspects of Japanese culture in other respects, exemplified a "democratic, more or less American way of life" (1943:154) . Despite their considered view of the camps as in some ways "ideal cities" (Spicer et al. 1969:11) , as places where the Japanese-American "minority is to make a new start in America" (Redfield 1943:152) , both the WRA and participating anthropologists emphasized that internment was only a transitional period preceding the release and complete absorption of the camp residents into American life. While ethnographers tended to regard the centers as an improvement on the Little Tokyos, they felt Japanese Americans had to be completely assimilated into the mainstream. The emphasis on the ultimate disbanding of the camps and dispersion of the internees became particularly strong when it became clear that some camp residents, mostly issei, had become so disillusioned by life on the outside that they wanted to settle permanently in the dusty Army barracks of the centers. Yet for all the changes, it is striking in the end how the history of anthropological involvement with the WRA speaks directly to many current dilemmas in the discipline. In the applied subfield, the same issues of legitimation and control are reintroduced in new forms by the expanding presence of anthropologists in AID and the World Bank, organizations that, particularly under the present administration, are often agents of American foreign policy. Anthropologists in these institutions continue as "scientific" advisors to authority, as do those who work for large companies interested in industrial management. In more mainstream academic anthropology, the traditional Weberian separation of science and politics that provided WRA ethnographers with a formal professional principle for not criticizing internment remains in force as a source of contradiction. In general, the issue perhaps most central to the WRA cohortthe utility of anthropological theory in social practice-is still very much unresolved. How to avoid ethnography that serves power, how to reconcile the professional and the political, how to do anthropology with value beyond academia: all these questions resonate as deeply in the present as in a reexamination of the past. 
